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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jess Aylett Construction ) 
Pet i t ioner, ) 
v, ) 
Board of Re'-MPM of.tht? ) BRIEF 
Industrial Commission of ) 
Utah- ) 
Respondent, ) 
The appellant files this brief as follows: 
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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT 
This case has been brought before the Utah Court of 
Appeals after being heard ancl ruled upon by the Industrial 
Commissron* The appellant feels that the Commission erred 
in its ruling 
-2-
NATURE OF THh PUJCLMUNua 
Allen White, who was injtucd on a job site of George 
Hobbs Construction is SUPHI^ Je^s Aylett Corutnii tn"»n for 
compensation,, contending th *t }r was an employee ot Jtss: 
Aylett Construction, wherer JP?" Aylett Construction states 
that Allen White n?" in employee oi George Hobbs Construction. 
3 
-Huu ur ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Jess Aylett Construction is not the original employer or 
general contractor on the job wher& Allen White was injured* 
George Hobbs^Construction was the general contractor and 
orginal employer. 
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STATEMENT ur inn uiw*. 
Allen White was injured on job site of George Hobbs 
Construction and is. sueirig • J e s s A y } e 11 C o n s t r u a t i o n f o r 
compensation) contending that he was an employee of Jess 
Aylett Construction, whereas Jess Construction states that 
Allen White was an employee of George Hobbs Construction, 
The following absolve Jess Aylett Construction from any 
liability to Allen White: 
U-C.A. 1953-35-1-42 (2) is pertina.nt to our disposition, 
and reads in part as follows. 
Where any employer procures any work to be 
done wholly or i n par t f oi h \. m by a con tractor o ver whose 
work he re ta i n s superv i s i on or contro 1 , and such is a 
part or process in the trade or business of the employer, 
such co n t r ac to r , a 11d a 1 1 per san-s employed by him, and all 
subcontractors under h im, arid a T1 persons einp 1 oyed by any 
such subcontractor, shall be deemed, within the meaning 
of this section, employees of such orginal employer. 
This clearly proves that -Jess Aylett was not the original 
employer ofgen e r a 1 c o n t r a c t o r , T h e e n t i t y i n t h e pr e s e n t 
case who fits the definition of "gener.nl contractor" or 
"orginal employer" is Genrge Hobbs, 
In light of all supreme court cases that, have used and 
relied upon 35-1-42, it can be correctly pointed out that the 
persons against whom 35-1-42 (2) was construed, are all either 
orginal employers*on a given project or general contractors, 
not subcontractors down the line like Jess Aylett, 
See, Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah 726 P.2d 
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427 (Utah 1986);. Pussier lodge v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah 562 P.2d 227 (Utah 1977); Harry L. Young and Sons, Inc. 
v. Ashton, 538 P. 2d 316 (Utfah 1375); Bamhrough v. Bethers, 
552 P. 2d 28B (Utah 1976); Pinter Contructiorw Co, v. Frisby, 
878 P. 2d 305-(Utah 1984). The only entity liable under 
35-1-42 (2) in the instant case is George Hobbs Construction; 
It is Hobbs Con str uction> iIot Jess Ay1e11 , who i s the o r g ina 1 
employer or general contractor in the project in which Allen 
White was hurt, 
Careful reading of III of the Sennet opinion (starting at 
page of 431 of volume 726 P. 2d) reveals the statutory intent 
and the supreme courts recu^nition of the intent that 35-1-42 
(2) is meant for genera 1 coniractors. The Supreroe Court in 
Bennett stated amoung nth^v things as follows: 
According to Proffessor U r s o n » statutes of this kind 
35- 1-42 (2) were pas sed to protect employees o f i rre spon-
and uninsured su bcon tr a c t o rs by imposing u1t i ma t e 1i a b i 1 -
ity on the presumably responsible, principal contractor, 
who has it within his power, in choosing subcontractors, 
to pass upon their responsibility and insist on appropri-
ate c o m p e n s a t i o r! p r u tec I. i n n f o r I h e i r workers* 
Id. pg 431 
The Court further quoted, a r. f.-H.-iys: 
Under 35-1-42 (2) a subcontractor * s employee is rleemed 
an employee of the general con tractor if ( 1 1 i-he general 
cent r a c t o r r e t a i ij s s <:• m e s u ve r \.' i s j o n o r control over- the 
subcontractor's work, (2) The uio.rk done by the subcon-
tract or is a 'part or pr-oi::.:ess in the trade or business 
- C j -
of the employer,' (Citing -the Pinter, Rustler Lodge, and 
Harry L. Young & Sons casei;). A subcontractor's work is 
a 'part or process in t*ht trade or business of the 
employer* if it is part of the operations which directly 
relate to the successful performance of the general cont-
ractor's enterprise. 
The trade or busine^ *-: <<f a general contractor in the 
construction business is construct ion.... and any pott ion 
of a general contractnt 's construction project which is 
subcontracted out will ordinarily be considered 'part or 
process in the trade or business' of the 'general con-
tractor . 
Id.pg 431 
Further quoting, from the Bennett case: 
The Requirement in 34-1-42 (2) That the general contrac-
tor as a 'statutory employer' retain 'supervision or 
control' ovei th^ work of the subcontractor who hired the 
'statutory employee' cannot, by definition* be equated 
with the common law standard for determining whether a 
person is an employee or an independent contractor. 
Id.pg 428 
Under statiUe, subronii n tor\s employee is deemed employ-
ee of general contractor if general contractor retains 
some supervision or umirul over subcontradoer*s work 
and work done by subrontractoi is part or process in 
trade or business of employer. 
Term supervision m control in workmen's compensation 
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statute requires only that general contractor retains 
ultimate control over project in ordre to retain 
^supervision or control ,rv so. as to make general contractor 
a statutory employer," 
As long as subcontractor's work is part or process of 
general contractor's business, an inference arises that 
general contractor has retained supervision or control 
over subcontractor sufficient to meet requirement of 
worker's compensation statute. 
Kather than quote the entire opinion, we submit that careful 
reading of the balance of III of the opinion will bring up 
repeated references to general contractors and disscussion of 
how those general contractors are, or are not "statutory 
employers" of a subcontractor's employee* 
We again would submit the policy explainations given by 
Professor Larson, which policy explanation was quoted by the 
Supreme Court in the Bennet case* i.e., the statutory employer 
provision is meant to point directly to the presumably respon-
sible principal contractor. We therefore, respectfully submit 
that the application of the statutory employer doctrine 
against Jess Aylett in the present is not grounded in control-
1ing or case law. 
The whole notion of the legislative enactment 35-1-42(2) 
was to place the weight of responsibility for irresponsible 
uninsured subcontractors, on the shoulders of the principle 
general contractor. The supreme court law interpretation 
35-1-42(2) was meant for general contractors, not Jess Aylett, 
The conclusion must be that there is no statutory basis for 
-3-
imposing statutory employment on a mid tier subcontractor. 
™g_ 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Jess Aylett Construi tiuu was not the statory employer or 
employer of Allan White*. George HoVbs was the principle 
and statutory employer nf Allan White. 
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A K G U F l i i N l 
Jess Aylett submits that the evidence submitted supports 
the fact that Allen. White wv; an employee of George Hobbs 
Construction, With respect to the rulings of the Supreme 
court which quoted- from the Bennett case 35-1-42(2) clearly 
proves that Jess Aylett was not the employer of Allen White 
and therefore is not responsible or liable for compensa-
sion in anyway to him for injuries suffered on the job. 
The evidence proves that Allan White was an employee 
of George Hobbs Construction as shown in Sec- 35-1-42(2) 
and as the employer and statutory employer, George Hobbs is 
liable for all compensation due. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion with the exidence given previosly in this 
brief, we feel that.we have proven that Jess Aylett is not 
liable to Allan White for injurys suffered on the job. 
We also feel that we have proven that George Hobbs is the 
Statutory employer of Allan White. In light of these findings, 
this suit should have never been brought against Jess Aylett 
and thereby pray the court dismiss this case with prejudice* 
Dated this 5th day of August, 1989 
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